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PRACTICAL COMPANY EXPERIENCE IN
ENTERING U.S. MARKETS: SIGNIFICANT
ISSUES AND HURDLES FROM THE
ISSUER'S PERSPECTIVE
M. Shane Warbrick*
I suppose one of the reasons I was invited to participate in
this Conference today is that if Fletcher Challenger Limited
("Fletcher Challenge") was capable of achieving a registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), probably
any other company could to do an issue of targeted or letter
stock as well. Our history and background are probably more
complex, and we have a longer history of differences than most
other companies and corporations.
Fletcher Challenge is a diversified international company
headquartered in New Zealand, with operations in New Zealand,
Australia, Canada, the United States, Brazil, China, Asia, the
South Pacific, and the United Kingdom. Fletcher Challenge's
primary businesses are in: newsprint and pulp production; plan-
tation forestry, which is growing forests from seedlings and har-
vesting the solid wood; oil, gas, and methanol production; and
building materials and construction around the Pacific Rim.
Initially we were only going forward with registration as a
vehicle for listing our shares. Following registration, we became
the first non-U.S. company to do an issue of stock based on our
plantation forestry business, which had a fair number of unusual
issues. That was an interesting experience. That particular re-
gistration was done very quickly, to say the least. We achieved
that registration in one month. The process can be effected
very, very quickly.
Let me go through a little bit of our history. New Zealand
was probably the hardest hit country following the 1987 market
collapse. We probably had one of the most hyped-up equity
markets around the world, having had the highest returns of any
market for the last eighteen months before October 1987, and
then we had the hardest crash as well, which was hardly a sur-
prise.
* Group Controller, Fletcher Challenge Limited, Auckland, New Zealand.
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Following the crash, most other markets in the world recov-
ered, but New Zealand did not. One of the reasons why the New
Zealand market did not recover is that the trust and confidence
in the New Zealand regulatory and accounting standards was ba-
sically shattered by the events after the crash, such as one or two
large companies failing, and poor regulatory enforcement.
Many of the investors who had actually lost money used the ac-
counting standards as the excuse for the loss, rather than the
fact that they had really bought things that no one in their right
mind should have purchased. But in that environment, once
you lose trust, it is very hard to attract investors back to a market.
Fletcher Challenge, having diversified shareholdings world-
wide, with up to twelve to fourteen percent of its shareholdings
being held by U.S. investors, fourteen percent by Australian in-
vestors, and a like number by European investors, with only just
slightly more than fifty percent in our home market, had to ad-
dress that confidence issue up-front and actually solve it, other-
wise we would only end up going one way-being owned by
someone else very quickly. We decided that the only way we
could solidify investor confidence, especially coming from a New
Zealand accounting background, which utilizes revaluation ac-
counting in the British form, was to adopt U.S. generally ac-
cepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), the most accepted
benchmark of accounting worldwide.' So we engaged in a pro-
cess to conform our accounting as much as possible with U.S.
GAAP, where New Zealand GAAP and New Zealand law allowed,
and once completing that process, to go forward with a SEC re-
gistration.
We needed to conform with U.S. GAAP for our own markets
as much as we needed it to go forward with a U.S. issue, and if we
were going to have offerings in Asia. There are just too many
1. See Richard C. Breeden, Foreign Companies and US. Markets in a Time of Economic
Transformations, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S77, S85-96 (1994) (discussing superiority of
U.S. disclosure requirements and accounting practices); Pat McConnell, Practical Com-
pany Experience in Entering US. Markets: Significant Issues and Hurdles from the Advisor's
Perspective, 17 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. S120, S122 (1994) (discussing superiority of U.S. dis-
closure requirements and accounting practices). But see William E. Decker, The Attrac-
tions of the US. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the
US. Markets: From the Issuer's Perspective, 17 FoRDH m INT'L LJ. S10, S23-24 (1994) (not-
ing difficulty of reconciling with U.S. GAAP); James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory
Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate?, 17 FoRHAm INT'L LJ. S58, S61-67 (1994)
(noting need for more flexibility in U.S. accounting requirements).
S113
Si14 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:S112
equity securities being offered around the world these days for
people not to be able to understand and trust your financial
statements and your presentations easily. U.S. GAAP gave us
that credibility in presentation.
In reality, the cost of actually achieving financial statements
in accordance with U.S. GAAP is low. Once you've got your ac-
counting system set up to produce the information, you go for-
ward and just produce it as part of your normal process. We
have found very little difficulty in continuing, updating, and pro-
ducing the information once we were able to calculate exactly
what is needed.
We have made acquisitions of companies that haven't main-
tained accounting standards in accordance with U.S. GAAP, and
in particular we acquired a number of privatized companies
from the New Zealand government, where we have had horren-
dous problems replicating the information that they should have
produced; being government-owned companies, they tended to
use cash-type accounting methods, common to government ac-
counts. So we haven't had huge problems in conforming to U.S.
accounting standards other than solving one or two acquisition-
type issues.
However, we have had some significant conceptual issues.
In some instances, New Zealand accounting methods covers
items that U.S. GAAP does not address. When you get into dif-
ferences of geography and businesses, you will find certain prac-
tices that are just different. You've actually got to formulate and
try to work out what the U.S. GAAP rules would be for certain
items that U.S. GAAP does not in fact consider. That was one of
our troublesome areas to work through.
In the registration path we followed, we found the need to
thoroughly understand the accounting crisis we were about to
undergo. There was no point in going to the SEC, probably the
supreme regulatory body in the world, without actually having
some knowledge of what we were trying to achieve and what the
difficulties of that achievement would be.3 We spent a fair
2. See Breeden, supra note 1, at S85-96 (discussing superiority of U.S. disclosure
requirements and accounting practices). But see Decker, supra note 1, at S23-24 (noting
difficulty of reconciling with U.S. GAAP); Cochrane, supra note 1, at S61-67 (noting
need for more flexibility in U.S. accounting requirements).
3. See Frode Jensen, III, The Attractions of the U.S. Securities Markets to Foreign Issuers
and the Alternative Methods of Accessing the U.S. Markets: From a Legal Perspective, 17 FoRD-
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amount of time trying to understand the role of the lawyers, the
independent accountants, the SEC, and ourselves in what this
process should actually look like and how it should be done.4
One of the decisions we made, rightly or wrongly, was that
we would do the registration without trying to do an immediate
public offering - the reason being that we effectively were able
to cut one player, the investment banker, from the registration
process, thus simplifying the process somewhat.5 Furthermore,
simply listing without an immediate and corresponding offer of
securities removed the market imposed time pressure associated
with such public offerings, which assured us the luxury of plan-
ning the registration at our own pace. If we ran into problems,
we wouldn't have to worry about the offering window closing on
us, which would result in fatal consequences; we could just defer
registration to a later date.6 In fact, I think that process actually
allowed us to achieve a quicker registration than if we had said,
"We've got to do an issue in six weeks' time; can we please have a
registration?" I know it was a lot more pleasant for us to do than
to go down the market constraint timetable route.
The start of the process was with an audit - we actually had
ajoint audit between KPMG Peat Marwick ("Peat Marwick") and
Coopers & Lybrand ("Coopers"). We went spent a lot of time
understanding what the accounting entries were from a U.S.
point of view while trying to get the New York offices of Coopers
and Peat Marwick to understand us, which was not a trifling ex-
ercise.7 We did not want any surprises as we worked through the
process.' We knew that knowledge in the end was the only thing
that was going to protect us and lead us safely down the registra-
tion path. So we put a lot of time into establishing communica-
tions and getting people to understand what we wanted. We had
HAM INT'L L.J. S25, S32-34 (1994) (discussing role of management in registration pro-
cess).
4. See Decker, supra note 1, at S20-21 (noting role of key players in registration
process).
5. See id. (discussing various roles of key players in securities offering in United
States by non-U.S. company); Jensen, supra note 3, at S32-34 (discussing role of man-
agement in registration process).
6. See Decker, supra note 1, at S15-16 (discussing listing alternative);Jensen, supra
note 3, at S33-34 (discussing registration time frame).
7. See Jensen, supra note 3, at S32-34 (highlighting importance of management's
involvement in registration process).
8. See id. at S29-34 (discussing registration process for non-U.S. companies in
United States).
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people from New York spend time in New Zealand and people
from New Zealand spend time in New York.9 We spent a fair
number of weeks just basically talking.
It's surprising the number of things that you wouldn't even
dream of being issues, because they are minor things you do by
habit or instinct, that turn out of be issues that you actually have
to work through. For example, the use of different terms for the
same thing probably caused more problems than those issues ex-
pected to be major problems. 10
One of the areas where we did run into problems was how
we calculate deferred taxation."' New Zealand has always been
on the liability method of deferred taxation, but our New Zea-
land grouping rules and our method of recognizing benefits cre-
ated problems that we never would have dreamed of under the
liability method of accounting.1 2 We had to work through those.
Those were issues that really were a bit of a surprise in the end.
Interest capitalization to long-term assets was something
that we had traditionally thought would be identical. However,
there were a lot of the differences in terminology as much as
differences in actually what you do. We spent probably eighty
percent of our time making sure that we were saying the same
thing to each other and finding there really wasn't a problem in
the end.
The other area that seemed insurmountable from our point
of view to the U.S. point of view is the way hedging and covering
of risk, interest rate, and foreign currency is dealt with. But,
once identified, we were able to work through those issues.
Some of them you just have to accept as different. If you are
operating under a different set of rules, they are the rules of the
market you've gone to, and you have to accept them. And also,
by the very fact you want to go there, you are acknowledging that
9. See id. (discussing registration process for non-U.S. companies in United States).
10. See id. (discussing difficulties that arise during registration process of non-U.S.
companies entering U.S. capital markets).
11. See M. Elizabeth Rader, Accounting Issues in Cross Border Securities Offerings, 17
FoRDi-m INT'L LJ. S129 (1994) (discussing key accounting and disclosure issues facing
non-U.S. companies); Matthew M. McKenna, Tax Issues in Cross Border Securities Offerings,
17 FoarDtmi INT'L L.J. S140 (1994) (discussing tax issues that arise in securities offer-
ings by non-U.S. companies in U.S. capital markets).
12. See Rader, supra note 11, at S129 (discussing key accounting and disclosure
issues facing non-U.S. companies); McKenna, supra note 11, at S140 (discussing tax
issues that arise in securities offerings by non-U.S. companies in U.S. capital markets).
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they're probably the best in the world and result in the best
product coming out. We are the first to acknowledge that the
product that comes out of the U.S. process is superior to the
product that comes out of any other process, and therefore, the
United States is the most attractive market to deal with. Simplic-
ity doesn't necessarily actually end up producing the best result.
The whole process we worked through probably took two
years because we changed our own accounts from being very
strongly New Zealand domestic-type accounts with some things
that other people would think were strange. 13 We might still
think they produced a better accounting result, but the result
was just not acceptable to anyone outside of New Zealand. So we
conformed our accounts as much as possible to U.S. GAAP
under our rules, which took a good eighteen months to work
through.
We reduced our U.S. GAAP differences to things we just
couldn't avoid. There are just some things that New Zealand
and New Zealand GAAP don't allow or require that U.S GAAP
requires.' 4 Those conflicts will continue, I think, probably until
Judgment Day. You're never going to get all the sets of regula-
tors to accept the same standards. Different influences produce
different results.
Once we had identified all of the issues and those things we
couldn't resolve, we moved to a pre-filing conference with the
SEC. 5 Most importantly, the conference gave us a resolution on
outstanding items. As an international entity, you should not go
forward in an offering with a feeling of uncertainty.' 6 You actu-
ally produce your documents and produce your registration
13. SeeJensen, supra note 3, at S32-34 (highlighting importance of management's
involvement in registration).
14. See Breeden, supra note 1, at S85-96 (discussing superiority of U.S. disclosure
requirements and accounting practices); McConnell, supra note 1, at S122 (discussing
superiority of U.S. disclosure requirements and accounting practices). But see Decker,
supra note 1, at S23-24 (noting difficulty of reconciling with U.S. GAAP); Cochrane,
supra note 1, at S61-67 (noting need for more flexibility in U.S. accounting require-
ments).
15. See Richard Kosnik, The Role of the SEC in Evaluating Foreign Issuers Coming to US.
Markets, 17 FoaDrt INr'L LJ. S97 (1994) (noting willingness of SEC to assist non-U.S.
companies entering U.S. capital markets); Rader, supra note 11, at S129 (noting flexi-
bility of SEC in accommodating non-U.S. companies entering U.S. capital markets).
16. See Kosnik, supra note 15, at S97 (noting willingness of SEC to assist foreign
companies entering U.S. markets); Rader, supra note 11, at S129 (noting flexibility of
SEC in accommodating non-U.S. companies entering U.S. capital markets).
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statement knowing what's expected. I think going forward with
something that you know is an area of uncertainty and hoping
that it gets through the SEC after filing would be a rather fool-
hardy approach to take. It would just be too much work to han-
dle such accounting issues after filing. Approaching the SEC
first, clearly proved to be a more prudent way to proceed.
In terms of dealing with the SEC, I think we would have to
describe our experience as very pleasant. The SEC staff was al-
ways helpful, always trying to assist us through the problems.1"
As uncompromising as SEC standards are, the SEC staff was al-
ways seeking to help us through the process to find a solution
that was workable. I think that was the key. I think everyone was
trying to find a workmanlike solution to difficulties that arose,
one that allowed the transaction to go forward, not to block it. I
don't think we could express our appreciation for how strongly
we felt supported through that process, and helped through it as
well. We didn't expect compromise or a different set of stan-
dards, but the willingness to understand and help was always
there, and as was the willingness to put the time and effort into
it.
Our whole approach was to register and achieve the benefits
of registration with the least amount of tension and conflict as
possible.' I think we were actually quite successful. For exam-
ple, we followed our initial registration by registering our for-
estry stock rather quickly. This was something that was not only
a leader stock, it was an unusual asset. We wanted to set unusual
rules for ourselves in terms of dividend distribution and those
sort of things. I think our approach worked. I think a more
oblique approach would not have made the whole transaction
possible. We got through the process very quickly. Probably
from start to finish, the total process including breaking out the
various divisions was less than two months. Our main problems
were actually with stock exchanges outside of the United States,
not with the SEC, which was a little bit of a surprise to us, in
terms of the New Zealand Stock Exchange regulations and vot-
ing rights, which is one of the things some jurisdictions have a
17. See Kosnik, supra note 15, at S97 (noting willingness of SEC to assist foreign
companies entering U.S. markets); Rader, supra note 11, at S129 (noting willingness of
SEC to assist foreign companies entering U.S. markets).
18. See Decker, supra note 1, at S16-17 (discussing listing alternative).
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fair degree of concern about, rather than the disclosure-type is-
sues that concern the SEC.
Generally, Fletcher Challenge, with its wide business activi-
ties and fairly wide investor base, plus quite a number of private
placements in the U.S. debt markets, equity listings in Canada
and London, has stood us in good stead to actually work through
the process. Different environments and different regulations
weren't something that particularly worried us. We learned to
accept these things and that's the way you actually live.
So I think we were probably ideally placed. We may have
had a more complex organization to actually take us through the
registration process, as a result of our unusual history and back-
ground, but I think our attitude was probably more focused on
flexibility and understanding that you have to do things differ-
ently when a company enters a different market, especially when
you're going to the one that you believe is the best market to
actually be traded in.
The ongoing requirements, once you set them up to run
through your system properly, are not real difficulties with fu-
ture registrations. Overall, the experience is one that we would
recommend to other foreign issuers considering a U.S. offering.
Our experience has shown that the registration process was
much easier than the skeptics suggested it would be.
1994] S119
